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I offer some reflections on the place of science 
in law today and on the way science is viewed in 
our legal system. I particularly want to focus on the 
various contemporary narratives about the proper 
use and role of science, in two contexts:  (1) in the 
courtroom and (2) in the public policy debates in 
administrative agencies that regulate so many as-
pects of our lives.  Many lawsuits involve or are de-
cided on the basis of scientific knowledge  wherein 
each side calls on scientific experts to deliver deter-
minative science.  Examples include claims against 
chemical companies or pharmaceutical manufac-
turers for producing allegedly dangerous products 
or litigation concerning workplace injuries arising 
from contact with harmful substances.  In gov-
ernmental agencies that protect human health, as 
in Environmental Protection Agency’s attempts 
to control or reduce air or water pollution, or the 
Food & Drug Administration’s decisions about 
which foods and drugs are safe, there is, on the one 
hand, a profound reliance on science to make deci-
sions but, on the other hand, debate about what to 
do if the science is uncertain or which scientific 
studies to believe or whether the scientific deci-
sions have become infected by politics.
In both the courtroom and the rule-making 
activities of governmental agencies, our common 
sense would tell us that we should let science decide 
whether a workplace chemical caused the plain-
tiff’s cancer or whether genetically-modified food 
is dangerous or what level of mercury in water is 
safe for drinking.  But if we look closely at the law-
suits involving scientific issues or at the debates 
surrounding agency regulations, we find scientific 
controversy, contradictory scientific testimony, 
and high levels of scientific uncertainty.
What is our reaction to that state of affairs? 
Does it make us doubt the utility of science?  Or 
does our trust in science remain firm and lead us to 
doubt the ability of the legal and political systems 
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to get things right?  Those are the questions I want 
to address because a great deal is going on right 
now—from climate change to food regulation to 
concerns about the safety of plastic water bottles—
that should cause us to reflect on science, including 
both its potential to guide lawmakers and its limi-
tations as a source of stable knowledge. 
Part of that reflection on science involves the 
so-called “science wars.”  Those wars were preced-
ed by the so-called “culture wars,” the name given 
to the debates between modernists and postmod-
ernists in the humanities.  On the one side were the 
children of the Enlightenment, who believed in 
the capacity of human reason to overcome religion 
and other outdated traditions and to give us secure 
knowledge.  On the other side were postmodern-
ists, who claimed to end all totalizing narratives 
and who reduced knowledge to power. However, 
there is a softer version of postmodernism that is 
not as relativistic and is quite close to the Christian 
critique of rationalistic modernism. This softer 
version is one that 
recognizes the tradition-bound nature of all 
thinking, [that] understands [why] a purely objec-
tive and totally accurate expression of reality is 
impossible, that [does not ignore] the realities of 
power and coercion [and] that [recognizes that] all 
concepts have a history, and that all truths need 
to be put into their social and cultural context so 
as to understand their scope and claims more ac-
curately…. 1
Even though the term postmodern is sometimes used 
pejoratively in Christian circles, I like the forego-
ing description of soft postmodernism; I also notice 
the rhetorical move, where the author describes the 
extremes of Enlightenment rationalism and post-
modern nihilistic relativism and then constructs a 
Christian view as a mediating or middle position, a 
third way, which avoids the extremes. 
In the science wars that followed in the wake 
of the culture wars, the effort to avoid extremes 
is also apparent. On the one side are those who 
believe in the superiority of scientific knowledge 
to provide stable truths that transcend culture 
and history. On the other side are those histori-
ans, philosophers, and sociologists of science who 
emphasize that the scientific enterprise is human, 
who identify the social and institutional aspects of 
scientific communities, and who highlight the in-
terests at work in allegedly disinterested science.  In 
the most extreme version of the latter perspective, 
science is represented as a social construction, as 
just another cultural narrative without any unique 
claim to objective truth about reality.  In its softer 
version, which is less relativistic and quite close 
to the Christian critique of scientism, it recog-
nizes that science is not value-free and that there 
are genuine scientific disputes that destabilize any 
pretense that science is a machine-like producer of 
uncontroversial facts.
The science wars, a 1980s’ phenomenon, are 
obviously not a new topic or an earth-shaking 
revelation for Christian scholars.  There is a rich 
and substantial history of neo-Calvinist reflection 
on the natural sciences, as well as a centuries-old 
conversation about conflicts between science and 
religion, about whether science replaced religion or 
whether science is a religion, and so forth.  Calvin 
himself occupies an interesting position by having 
lived during the scientific revolution.  I recognize 
that the period identified as the scientific revolu-
tion, beginning with Copernicus, who lived from 
1473-1542, and ending with Newton, who lived be-
tween 1624-1727, is a purely modernist construc-
tion.  I agree with Steven Shapin that this period is 
not uniquely revolutionary2 —it is just a convenient 
marker with no more significance than the debate 
over when the medieval “period” ends and the 
modern “era” begins.  But it is convenient for my 
purposes that Calvin was born when Copernicus 
was 36 years old, that Galileo was born the year 
Calvin died, and so forth.  It is not clear wheth-
er Calvin knew of Copernicus, and even though 
Calvin accepted the faulty Ptolemaic system that 
almost everyone else accepted, we do not think 
that Calvin was against astronomical investigation 
or against scientific inquiry.3  Calvin does say that 
we do not get astronomy from the Scriptures, but 
Calvin does not degrade science—he simply warns 
that too much study of the creation might lead 
one to forget the Creator and might even lead one 
to think the universe was its own creator.4  That 
warning is quite prophetic; Steven Weinburg, the 
great physicist who is now not quite as great as a 
public intellectual, wrote in 2001 that
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One of the great achievements of science has 
been, if not to make it impossible for intelligent 
people to be religious, then at least to make it pos-
sible for them not to be religious.  We should not 
retreat from this accomplishment.5
I’ll return to Weinberg below because he is exem-
plary, both (1) with respect to his position in the 
science wars, as a worshiper of science, and (2) 
with respect to my argument that the science wars 
are very important nowadays in law and politics; 
indeed, the science wars are now firmly located 
within the beltway, in Washington, and were an-
ticipated by Abraham Kuyper.    
Over a hundred years ago, Kuyper dedicated 
the fourth of his Stone Lectures at Princeton to 
the nexus between Calvinism and science.6  Even 
though we need to be very careful to recognize 
Kuyper’s own background and historical context, 
that is, to recognize the particular views of science 
against which he was arguing, the lecture is never-
theless a sophisticated anticipation of the science 
wars to come.
Kuyper makes four points, four observations, 
about Calvinism and science—and even though 
neo-Calvinists use the word “science” broadly to 
include academic inquiry in all the disciplines, in-
cluding philosophy and history and even theology, 
note that Kuyper’s examples of science are almost 
all from the exact or natural sciences.  He first says 
that Calvinism fosters a “love for science,” and 
he mentions that the microscope, the telescope, 
and the thermometer were Dutch inventions.7 
Calvinists believe in law and order in the cosmos, 
which belief offers a foundation for empirical in-
quiry.8  Second, Calvinists do not place science below 
spirituality, as we have no contempt for the world, 
and he mentions the sixteenth-century plague in 
Geneva when prayer was accompanied by hygienic 
measures.9  This is where Kuyper mentions com-
mon grace and the ability of non-believers to excel 
in scientific inquiry.10  Third, Kuyper notes that 
scientific inquiry should be free from church, and 
state, interference.11  And fourth, Kuyper sees no 
conflict between faith and science.12  This is where 
Kuyper, anticipating the science wars, mentions 
that all science begins with faith—faith in our self-
consciousness, in our senses, in our intellect, in uni-
versal laws, and so forth.13  This begins to sound 
like a critique of scientism, but as Jaap Klapwijk 
points out,14 Kuyper was quite “scientistic” about 
the exact sciences—observation for Kuyper did 
not depend on the subjectivity of the researcher; as 
a result, Kuyper does not give us much of a critique 
of the physical sciences.
Later on, Dooyeweerd was more likely to chal-
lenge the myth of neutrality in the natural sciences, 
and he anticipated, much more than Kuyper did, 
the personal and creative aspects of scientific in-
quiry.  Even before Polanyi’s “framework of com-
mitment,” Habermas’s explication of human in-
terests, Radnitzky’s theory of steering fields, and 
Kuhn’s paradigm theory, Dooyeweerd offered 
many neo-Calvinists a basis for investigating the 
subjective and cultural aspects of the exact scienc-
es,15 and they did investigate those aspects.  From 
the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, the conferences 
and journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 
included a lively discussion of Christian perspec-
tives on science;16 and by the time I arrived at the 
Free University in 1975, the history and philoso-
phy of science were major fields of inquiry and con-
troversy.  By 1979, with the publication of Bruno 
Latour’s  and Steve Woolgar’s Laboratory Life,17 the 
sociology of science engendered the so-called sci-
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ence wars with a research program into the social, 
institutional, and rhetorical aspects of the scientific 
enterprise.  The sociology of scientific knowledge 
was a reaction against the idealized view of the sci-
entific enterprise, which described science solely in 
terms of theory, data-collection, conclusion, publi-
cation, and application or refutation.18  As to ambi-
tion, persuasion, funding bias, or cultural values, 
those were not (in the idealized view) part of sci-
ence; as to personal values, perception, consensus, 
or institutional gatekeeping, those were good for 
science but also not part of science itself.  In con-
trast, the sociologists of science revealed the prag-
matic nature of science, demonstrating that science 
was not merely influenced by but consisted of values, 
paradigms, cognitive and instrumental constraints, 
language and metaphors, consensus-building tech-
niques, reputation, and variable conventions.  If we 
view that assessment as an unfair challenge to the 
superiority of scientific knowledge, we are on one 
side of the science wars; and if we are comfortable 
with that assessment as a realistic account, we are 
on the other.  Of course, this is old news—there’s 
a great deal of literature from the 1980s and 1990s 
describing, clarifying, and taking controversial po-
sitions in the science wars.  So why am I talking 
about this?
Well, to my surprise, the science wars have ar-
rived in law.  Because of the need for judges and 
juries and governmental administrators to rely on 
science, the nature and reliability of the scientific 
enterprise have become important topics in legal 
discourse.  Now to be fair, the legal system’s reli-
ance on science is not new—we have had scientific 
experts in our courtrooms since the early nine-
teenth century,19 and we have also tried to regu-
late toxic substances and pharmaceuticals and even 
food for centuries.  But a couple of high-profile 
events in recent years have heated up the contro-
versy over the use of science in law.
First of all, there was a series of three U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions in the mid- to late- 1990s 
that together establish a new vision of science in 
the courtroom.20  Because each side in a lawsuit 
hires its own expert to testify, there had been con-
cerns for decades about junk science in the court-
room and about experts who become advocates 
for their clients, so the U.S. Supreme Court set up 
some new rules to ensure the reliability of scien-
tific testimony.  I think it’s fair to say that those 
new guidelines, and the immense, recent scholarly 
commentary concerning expertise in law, reflect a 
rather idealized or romanticized vision of the sci-
entific enterprise.21  Whereas law is represented as a 
field of controversy, argument, advocacy, and rhet-
oric, science is represented as completely different. 
Science seemingly involves stable knowledge, with-
out bias or interest or motivation.  Consequently, 
when two experts disagree, it is often assumed 
that one of them is a liar, a junk scientist, while the 
other is telling the truth.  In this new view of sci-
ence, there is not a lot of room for talking about sci-
entific controversy, argument, rhetoric, consensus-
building, or advocacy for one’s preferred scientific 
theory.  Indeed, if an expert concedes the limita-
tions of his knowledge, or admits that scientists are 
influenced by the communities or institutions in 
which they work, that expert is often condemned 
as not delivering determinative knowledge, which 
is what science is supposed to offer to the indeterminate 
and argumentative field of law.22  And there is even a 
trend to blame lawyers for the shortage of scien-
tific truth in the courtroom.  Some have suggested 
that lawyers have an ethical responsibility to en-
sure the accuracy of their experts because anyone 
can supposedly do a little research and figure out 
the scientific truth in a particular field.23  Such sug-
gestions are based on a very simplistic view of sci-
ence, as if scientists do not disagree and as if there 
are no genuine controversies among scientists.  
The second phenomenon that brought the dis-
course concerning science into law was the accusa-
tion that during the Bush administration, science 
became politicized.24  This kind of discourse also 
tends to idealize science and is the reason President 
Obama claims that his administration will pay at-
tention to science, not politics,25 as if there is pure 
science available if we would just pay attention. 
But is it really possible to remove worldviews and 
values from the scientific enterprise in the service 
of law?
Now, I could at this point construct a debate 
and say that on one side are those who trust science 
completely, and on the other side are those who 
do not trust the scientific establishment, perhaps 
because they believe that all science is politically 
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motivated or perhaps because they fear scientists 
as a bunch of Dr. Frankenstein’s with no moral 
sensitivity.  Then I could say that the Christian or 
neo-Calvinist view is somewhere in between.  But 
the debates over science in law are actually a lot 
more nuanced and more interesting than that, and 
it is probably better to organize the various narra-
tives concerning science on a continuum—there 
are various positions available in the debate, and I’ll 
identify five of them.
I will begin with those commentators who 
seem to have a near-complete faith in science as 
the single source of truth—I mentioned above the 
physicist Steven Weinberg, who wrote Facing Up: 
Science and Its Cultural Adversaries (2001).  That book 
is a diatribe against those who view science as a 
cultural activity involving values, theoretical bias-
es, and advocacy.  We might also think of Michael 
Specter’s recent book, titled Denialism:  How 
Irrational Thinking Hinders Scientific Progress, Harms the 
Planet, And Threatens Our Lives (2009).  The very ti-
tle of that book, Denialism, suggests that we should 
simply listen to the objective truths that science of-
fers us.  Among legal scholars, the parallel to such 
a perspective can be found in the work of Michael 
Saks, who thinks that the reason there is too much 
junk science in the courtroom is that lawyers don’t 
take the time to pay attention to scientific truth: 
Any attorney, like any intelligent citizen who takes 
the time to research a purported scientific subject, 
has the potential to reach her own conclusions 
about whether or not the field’s beliefs rest on a 
foundation of data and logic that is solid, mushy, 
or non-existent26
Anyone can do it. But what Saks ignores, in order 
to make such an observation, is that in litigation in-
volving scientific issues, there is often considerable 
uncertainty, dispute, and controversy among scien-
tific experts—(1) there may be no scientific con-
sensus against which to measure a legal judgment; 
(2) the number of studies may be limited; and (3) it 
is commonplace that competent, well-intentioned, 
and conscientious scientists utilize identical data 
and agree on identical criteria of interpretation, 
and then reach different conclusions.27  So it’s not 
just core data leading to a conclusion—there’s 
more going on.
In the regulatory arena, the parallel with those 
who worship science is those who say that risk as-
sessments should be value-free, without normative 
foundations.  Values, in this view, introduce biases 
into an otherwise rational process—the Food & 
Drug Administration, for example, should act on 
the basis of science alone.28  If we allow ethical, re-
ligious, or moral values in the door, then, it is said, 
the process becomes politicized and produces junk 
science.29  It is said that the inherent uncertainty of 
science, unfortunately, can be exploited to derail 
the appropriate process of value-free risk assess-
ment.30  Now that view, which finds its way into 
the literature on regulation, sounds naïve and old-
fashioned.  It idealizes science and promises objec-
tive guidance that is, in reality, rarely available.
So let’s move to the next position on the con-
tinuum, the more sophisticated view that acknowl-
edges the presence of non-scientific judgments. 
When we approve a product on the market because 
there is a “reasonable certainty of no harm,” we 
mean that the risk is acceptable to our society; this 
view is a value judgment based on the best science 
available.  This perspective concedes that scientists 
have interpretive disagreements, that they argue 
for plausible alternatives, and that they engage in 
vigorous debates.  However, this perspective holds 
out hope for value-free science because it is only 
high levels of scientific uncertainty that raise the 
need for value judgments—once we have high-
Because of the need 
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al warming—we  find multiple and contradictory 
certainties.33
Moreover, in the activity of risk-assessment and 
policy-making, we also have contradictory certain-
ties and plural rationalities.  And here’s the point: 
these contradictory certainties arise from culture, 
from cultural orientations, or worldviews.  In all 
of the previous positions on the continuum, there 
was no talk of culture because in policy discourse, 
we only turn to culture as a last resort—we pre-
fer to say there was scientific conflict or political 
conflict; but we can instead account for these regu-
latory conflicts in terms of cultural orientations.34 
Some people have a fundamental view of nature 
as robust and tolerant, while others see nature as 
ephemeral and vulnerable.35  One’s viewpoint is 
going to affect everything in debates over low-dose 
toxicity, global warming, or genetically modified 
foods.  To the extent that politically conservative 
or religious people are respectively individualistic 
and hierarchical, they tend to be skeptical of en-
vironmental risks, while those with communitar-
ian and egalitarian worldviews are more sensitive 
concerning global warming or nuclear power.  But 
then, in a curious reversal, when it comes to syn-
thetic biology, the engineering of new biological 
organisms, the conservative and religious citizens 
get very skeptical, while the egalitarian and com-
munitarian citizens are suddenly less sensitive be-
cause synthetic biology can stop diseases and feed 
the hungry.36  Those decisions are not made on the 
basis of science or risk-assessment techniques but 
are made on the basis of worldviews.  Each side is 
perfectly rational in terms of its convictions about 
the world.
Now, this is not simply an argument that 
politics infects the regulatory process.  I think of 
David Michael’s Doubt is Their Product:  How Industry’s 
Assault on Science Threatens Your Health (2008), which 
explains how tobacco and pharmaceutical lobby-
ists exploit scientific uncertainty and claim that 
the science is not certain enough to regulate many 
products.   That argument is basically that science 
is great but that politics gets in the way; it is another 
way of idealizing science as determinative.  Nor am 
I arguing, as anthropologist Paul Rabinow does, 
that we need to put ethicists and lawyers and social 
scientists in the laboratory so that scientists will be 
quality science, ample evidence, and small margins 
of error, the need for value judgments disappears.31
That brings us to the next perspective, even 
less idealistic about the stability of science, which 
views all risk assessments as judgment calls.  Even 
a scientist’s degree of confidence is not a scien-
tific matter, and our assessment of whether a sci-
entific analysis is relatively certain is grounded in 
pragmatic decisions about what to study, which 
variables to consider, how accurate our measure-
ments need to be, and how much potential error 
we’re willing to accept.  When we say something is 
“safe” or “injurious” or we say that the evidence is 
“ample” or “convincing” or “reasonably certain,” 
those words sound scientific but are actually non-
scientific judgments.32
Now this sounds like a really sophisticated 
view of the limitations of the scientific enterprise, 
but notice that we’re talking about the limitations 
of science within the risk-assessment or policy-
making context.  That is, there is still a strong fact/
value distinction, insofar as science is factual, and 
values only come into play as we consider the im-
pact of a substance or technology on society.  We 
begin with the inevitable scientific disagreements 
among technical experts; then we turn to the value 
conflicts as to the social and political evaluation of 
impacts.  
Now we can move to another, more radical, 
position on the continuum, even farther away from 
the idealized position from which I started.  I just 
described a seemingly sophisticated vision of the 
limits of science, wherein science necessarily in-
volves non-scientific judgments; and it is the tech-
nical disagreement among scientists that leads us 
or causes us to make value or political judgments. 
This makes it sound as if we have one thing, namely 
an identifiable uncertainty, in science, and then we 
begin to argue about what to do in the face of that 
monolithic uncertainty, and we argue for precaution 
and about how much risk to take.
We should go back to the scientific enterprise 
that produced the thing we’re calling uncertainty. 
That enterprise includes contradictory certainties 
and plural rationalities:  scientific debates gave rise 
to the label “uncertainty,” but in most major policy 
disputes—think of genetically modified foods, the 
danger of low-dose toxicity in plastic bottles, glob-
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faced with values and regulation at the outset of 
their activities  because Rabinow’s argument pre-
sumes that science is objective and value-free until 
the ethicists arrive.37
Rather, I am arguing for the acknowledgement 
of multiple interpretive frames, which reflect values 
but which see facts differently.38   People do not say, 
“I’m going to take a position or make an argument 
that serves my interests.”  Instead, people see things 
differently and perceive the level and acceptabil-
ity of the very same risks differently—that’s why 
I said we’re not dealing with scientific uncertainty 
followed by value judgments; we’re dealing with 
contradictory certainties.  Our selection of facts 
and values is not so much conscious and voluntary 
as it is grounded in our cultural assumptions.
In any event, that’s a fairly skeptical view of the 
power of science to guide policy decisions, and the 
only position left on my continuum is the view that 
scientists are untrustworthy.  So, where am I go-
ing with this?  I’m trying to find a framework that 
explains what is going on when law appropriates 
science, in the courtroom and in the regulatory 
process.
First, as to the courtroom, if we idealize sci-
ence, and we fail to acknowledge its pragmatic fea-
tures, we have oversimplified the ability of science 
to serve or supplement law with determinative 
knowledge.  Consequently, we cannot make sense 
of what is happening in U.S. courtrooms.  We ei-
ther have to say that all scientists are correct be-
cause they are scientists; but we know that isn’t true 
because scientific experts disagree in court all the 
time. Or we have to say that when two scientists 
disagree, one of them is a liar, and the other has 
the truth; but we know that good scientists have 
genuine disagreements, so we need a better picture 
of science to explain why scientists disagree.  The 
answer is to have a more modest view of science 
that acknowledges its pragmatic features.  Every 
science has a history, every science operates on the 
basis of probabilities, and every science involves 
value-driven communities, consensus-building, 
and limitations in terms of instrumentation, re-
sources, and human perception.  Furthermore, 
science changes—many forensic scientists who 
provided evidence for criminal trials, on the basis 
of fingerprint or hair or bite-mark identification 
techniques, have now been proven wrong by DNA 
evidence.39  So should we now glorify DNA as 
the final step in our quest for knowledge?  I don’t 
think so because even DNA analysis involves hu-
man beings and probabilities and possible errors—
it’s great stuff but not always a truth machine.40 
It is fabulous, but we need to remember that we 
thought fingerprint identification was flawless un-
til we started reversing convictions on the basis of 
new DNA evidence.
In the regulatory context, I don’t think we want 
to explain or account for our current scientific 
disputes by saying that the scientists on one side 
are liars or that they have been duped by lobby-
ists or their own political interests.  It makes more 
sense to identify cultural biases, which shape how 
evidence is gathered, interpreted, and reported. 
Whenever we have data, there is still room for se-
lecting, minimizing, maximizing, magnifying, and 
dramatizing data on the basis of social preferences, 
even as we claim to be merely applying scientific 
expertise.41  The very perception of risk, or reason-
able certainty, is framed by values in order to make 
strategic arguments.  Some people have a precau-
tionary worldview, and some have a Promethean 
worldview, the latter of which implies that we can 
technologically solve all our problems and that, 
therefore, we need not be so cautious.42  Both sides 
use science, so we cannot say, “Let’s just let science 
decide who is right.”  Long before we leave the 
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scientific realm to enter law and politics, we have 
conflicting conceptual lenses.  The very criteria for 
uncertainty, sound science, reliable evidence, and 
adequate research are not fixed but vary according 
to ideological commitments, social contexts, and 
interpretive frames. Therefore, any appeals to sci-
ence as the final arbiter are oversimplifications.
In conclusion, when we visit courtrooms and 
regulatory agencies and we see how science is used, 
the debates are hard to explain unless we have a 
sense, a neo-Calvinist sensibility, that worldviews 
affect everything, even the exact sciences.  We love 
and enjoy scientific progress and its benefits, but 
we do not idealize its potential to answer every 
question—science does not give us our purposes, 
aims, and priorities, and it comes to us with un-
certainties, institutional biases, and even built-in 
values as to what was worth investigating, what 
could be funded, and what was advocated for and 
negotiated in scientific communities.  We should 
neither worship nor distrust science, but rather we 
should recognize its limitations as the stabilizer of 
legal and regulatory disputes.
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